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A B S T R A C T   
Climate change impacts, adaptation and vulnerability studies tend to confine their attention to impacts and 
responses within the same geographical region. However, this approach ignores cross-border climate change 
impacts that occur remotely from the location of their initial impact and that may severely disrupt societies and 
livelihoods. We propose a conceptual framework and accompanying nomenclature for describing and analysing 
such cross-border impacts. The conceptual framework distinguishes an initial impact that is caused by a climate 
trigger within a specific region. Downstream consequences of that impact propagate through an impact trans-
mission system while adaptation responses to deal with the impact propagate through a response transmission 
system. A key to understanding cross-border impacts and responses is a recognition of different types of climate 
triggers, categories of cross-border impacts, the scales and dynamics of impact transmission, the targets and 
dynamics of responses and the socio-economic and environmental context that also encompasses factors and 
processes unrelated to climate change. These insights can then provide a basis for identifying relevant causal 
relationships. We apply the framework to the floods that affected industrial production in Thailand in 2011, and 
to projected Arctic sea ice decline, and demonstrate that the framework can usefully capture the complex system 
dynamics of cross-border climate impacts. It also provides a useful mechanism to identify and understand 
adaptation strategies and their potential consequences in the wider context of resilience planning. The cross- 
border dimensions of climate impacts could become increasingly important as climate changes intensify. We 
conclude that our framework will allow for these to be properly accounted for, help to identify new areas of 
empirical and model-based research and thereby support climate risk management.   
1. Introduction 
In 2011 Thailand experienced the longest duration flooding event in 
its recorded history (158 days), resulting in more than 800 deaths and 
affecting 13.6 million people in the country itself (Promchote et al., 
2016). Devastating as these floods were for Thailand, the impacts 
beyond its borders were equally notable. The Bangkok region is home to 
large industrial parks that host numerous high value manufacturing 
concerns, many also located close to coastal port facilities to reduce 
transportation costs. Seven parks were badly affected, leading to enor-
mous losses in the automobile and electronics industries (primarily 
Japanese companies), due to inundation of plants supplying key com-
ponents to manufacturers in Thailand, throughout Asia and beyond. The 
implications of these severe inundation events at critical nodes in highly 
inter-connected global supply chains led to impacts that propagated far 
beyond the borders of Thailand. For example, ripple effects on the global 
economy were estimated to have reduced Japan’s fourth quarter 2011 
manufacturing production index by 2.4% (UN-ESCAP, 2012). The cau-
ses of the disastrous flood impacts are multi-faceted, but point to an 
imperative to build enhanced resilience into those components where 
impacts were propagated. However, superimposed on all of these im-
mediate challenges is the spectre of a changing climate and associated 
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sea-level rise, with the expectation of more frequent and severe events of 
this kind occurring in the future (Promchote et al., 2016). This example 
points more generally to the need for research on analogous cross-border 
climate change impacts and for their urgent consideration in adaptation 
planning. 
Cross-border climate change impacts can be defined as consequences 
of climate change that occur remotely from the location of their initial 
impact, where both impacts, and potentially also responses to those 
impacts such as adaptation, are transmitted across one or more borders. 
The potential consequence therefore constitutes a risk in a region of in-
terest that is remote from the location of the initial impact. The borders may 
be political (e.g., between countries or country groups), administrative 
(e.g., between sub-national jurisdictions), or “teleconnected” via more 
remote links (Benzie et al., 2019). Conventional climate change impacts, 
adaptation and vulnerability studies, including national risk assess-
ments, tend to confine their attention to impacts and responses within 
the same geographical region (Fig. 1). It has been argued that this may 
expose major blind spots concerning the interactions and amplifications 
of impacts and their international dimensions (Challinor et al., 2017). 
In this paper we propose a conceptual framework and accompanying 
nomenclature for describing and analysing cross-border climate change 
impacts. One difficulty faced in attempting this, is that research into 
cross-border impacts is dispersed and fragmented, often being addressed 
within different contexts or classified under contrasting headings. For 
example, in the regional impact chapters of the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC) Fifth Assessment Report “cross-regional 
phenomena” are referred to, which include impacts of climate change on 
international trade, on financial flows and on human migration and 
transboundary ecosystems (Hewitson et al., 2014). However, the 
detailed description of these impacts is dispersed across thematic 
chapters of the report. 
The limited work that has considered cross-border impacts to date all 
suggests that these impacts can be non-trivial, meriting more detailed 
attention. It includes a number of national risk assessments in Europe, 
such as for the UK, Switzerland, the Netherlands and Finland, which 
have been summarised by Benzie et al. (2019), and for the United States 
(Smith et al., 2018), Norway (Prytz et al., 2018) and Germany (Peter 
et al., 2021). The studies highlighted potential impacts of increases in 
adverse climate events on trade, businesses and supply chains and the 
political and security implications of impacts on partner countries, 
requiring intervention in terms of development assistance, diplomacy 
and foreign policy. One study for the UK, for example, concluded that 
cross-border impacts on trade, investment and supply chains for food 
could be an order of magnitude larger than domestic impacts (PwC, 
2013). 
Other studies include emerging work on climate change risks in 
global supply chains (Ghadge et al., 2020), on transboundary water 
stress (Munia et al., 2020) and on trade implications of heat-related 
labour productivity losses (Knittel et al., 2020), some sector-based 
economic studies (e.g., impacts of weather shocks on the world food 
system – Janssens et al., 2020; Gaupp et al., 2020) and selective 
vulnerability mapping exercises (Hedlund et al., 2018). The European 
Environment Agency also draws attention to the phenomenon as part of 
a larger assessment of climate change impacts and vulnerability in 
Europe (Lung et al., 2017). 
The importance of cross-border links has also been stressed in other 
fields of research. For instance, networks of cross-border financial ex-
posures have been highlighted that can contribute to the propagation of 
impacts across otherwise remote geographical regions (e.g., Bricco and 
Xu, 2019; Aldasoro et al., 2020; ECB, 2020). 
Why, then, focus on the risks resulting from cross-border climate 
change impacts specifically? The main reason is that climate change has 
developed into an important scientific and policy field in its own right. 
As a result there is a need for structure and clarity to identify the 
mechanisms via which climate change creates risks for society (see 
Simpson et al., 2021 for a detailed framing of this). Knowledge on 
climate change impacts, adaptation and vulnerability is synthesised by 
the IPCC Working Group II and is meant to inform existing policy pro-
cesses that aim to facilitate adaptation including those coordinated at 
the international scale by the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) including the National Adaptation Plans 
process. These processes have been criticised for adopting an overly 
territorial or geographically bounded view of climate change impacts 
and adaptation (see Liverman, 2016; Magnan and Ribera, 2016; Benzie 
and Persson, 2019). Therefore, there is a need to raise awareness of the 
importance of cross-border climate change impacts within the existing 
scientific and policy realms that already work on addressing the problem 
of climate change; this is a primary objective of the conceptual frame-
work presented below. 
Previous studies have also attempted to address this problem. For 
example Moser and Hart (2015), invoking the concept of societal tele-
connections, suggest a framework that describes the processes, struc-
tures and substances that connect different locations (“here” and 
“there”) that will be impacted by climate change. Subsequently, 
Fig. 1. Relationship between an impact and a response: a) in conventional climate change impacts, adaptation and vulnerability (IAV) assessments, where the impact 
and response to that impact lie within the same region; b) in cross-border IAV assessments, where impacts and responses (i.e., adaptations) are located in two regions 
separated by a border (e.g., political or administrative), with impacts transmitted between the regions (red arrow) and possible ameliorative responses transmitted 
back towards the impacts (green arrows). 
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Challinor et al. (2018) list international and domestic factors that will 
influence transboundary and trans-sector climate risk transmission. The 
framework we propose builds on these and other similar endeavours (e. 
g., Hedlund et al., 2018; Adaptation Without Borders, 2019; Gaupp, 
2020), aiming first, to provide more detail on the elements that consti-
tute and influence the cross-border transmission of climate change im-
pacts and second, to achieve a more comprehensive and flexible 
framework for facilitating application to and comparison between cases 
from all sectors, scales and systems. 
The relative neglect of cross-border impacts in national and inter-
national policy-making may increase potential risks and the costs of 
inaction. However, the design of actionable adaptation strategies to 
address such risks calls for a proper conceptualisation of the processes, 
scales and dynamics involved. Yet, whilst there are numerous methods 
and tools available to investigate selected dimensions of cross-border 
impacts, risks and responses, hitherto there has been no attempt to 
systematise these using consistent terminology (e.g., see discussion by 
Benzie et al., 2017) into a coherent methodological framework for 
designing scientific analyses and policy responses. 
A conceptual framework can hence be useful for:  
• providing a nomenclature or common language to describe structural 
elements of cross-border climate change impacts and their 
interactions;  
• enhancing understanding and raising awareness by characterising and 
classifying the different elements involved (e.g., drivers, triggers, 
processes, dynamics and scales) to provide a systematic and trans-
parent mapping of cross-border climate change impacts;  
• facilitating consistent comparison of cross-border impacts in different 
sectors and geographies within a common framework, even if these 
may have been analysed across a range of disciplines that use con-
trasting data and methods with different degrees of complexity (e.g., 
compare cross-border impacts of flooding in the context of a trans-
boundary river basin versus a global financial network);  
• informing adaptation planning, by offering a structure both for 
exploring, identifying and assessing the risks and uncertainties 
resulting from cross-border climate change impacts and for targeting 
effective responses within the wider context of enhancing resilience. 
In the following sections we first assemble the elements and 
nomenclature of a suggested framework. In Section 3 we introduce a 
selective typology of impacts and responses that can be used to char-
acterise the elements of the framework. Section 4 demonstrates the 
framework using concrete examples – some already observed; others 
ongoing, anticipated or hypothetical. Section 5 discusses the potential 
utility of the framework for enhancing risk assessment and informing 
climate change adaptation planning, with some conclusions drawn in 
Section 6. 
2. Framing cross-border impacts and responses 
The framework focuses on how a climate impact occurring at a given 
location may be transmitted across borders, potentially presenting a risk 
to a region of interest that is remote from the initial impact, which may 
require a response from actors in that region. Implicit is an assumption 
of demonstrable or, if that is not feasible, of plausible causality in the 
relationships between linked elements of the framework. The elements 
are illustrated in Fig. 2. 
It distinguishes first, a climate trigger that induces an initial impact, 
though other non-climatic triggers (e.g., economic, geophysical, health- 
related or geopolitical shocks) may precondition or exacerbate the 
impact. Hence, the impact is “initial” in the sense of being the system 
component first affected significantly by climate, serving as a point of 
departure for the research focus here. The climate trigger may be a 
short-period weather shock or slow onset event (see section 3.1). A 
central premise of the framework is that the frequency and/or 
magnitude of the climate trigger can be linked to and is liable to be 
altered by a changing climate. Hence the question of climate change 
attribution (e.g., Otto, 2016) is of importance in this context as well as 
attribution of the initial impact to a climate cause (Rosenzweig and 
Neofotis, 2013). 
The initial impact of a climate trigger is felt in the region(s) in which 
the climate trigger operates. It may then have downstream consequences 
that can propagate across space (sometimes crossing borders) and 
through time (usually lagging behind the initial impact). We refer to this 
propagation of impacts as an impact transmission system and it can vary 
enormously in its direction and complexity (blue area in Fig. 2). 
Transmission mechanisms encompass various flows that might be 
physical (e.g., raw materials, commodities, manufactured goods), in-
formation (e.g., price, capital, data) or natural (e.g., ecosystem services, 
species). 
The location of the border in Fig. 2 is merely notional, since cross- 
border impacts may occur across single or multiple borders that can 
be close to or more distant from the regional of interest. Impacts 
occurring at any point in the impact transmission system are themselves 
very likely to be subject to local responses of the type depicted in Fig. 1a. 
However, these are not shown in Fig. 2 as our focus is on the potential 
aggregate or net impact that may be transmitted into a region of interest. 
This we define as the recipient risk. Note that though the term risk 
Fig. 2. Conceptual framework for the transmission of cross-border impacts and 
responses. An initial impact in one region due to a climate trigger is propagated 
(red arrows) via an impact transmission system (blue area) comprising impacts 
on interconnected system components of varied complexity, resulting in a 
recipient risk in a second region (location of the border is notional). Adaptive 
responses for ameliorating that risk (green arrows) can be targeted within a 
response transmission system (green area) directly at the recipient risk itself, at 
the impact transmission system and at the site of initial impact (solid arrows), 
and indirectly via system components external to the impact transmission 
system (dashed arrows). Responses can occur prior (T-1) or subsequent (T2) to 
the times of the initial impact (T0) and recipient risk (T1), to indicate antici-
patory or reactive adaptation. The ability to respond can vary in terms of the 
sphere of influence exerted by the regional actor managing the recipient cross- 
border risk (strength of background green shading tone). Note that a response 
with longer-term effectiveness, operating directly on the climate trigger and not 
shown here, would be greenhouse gas mitigation. Transmission systems are 
shown in relation to external systems that may include non-climate drivers of 
key importance in understanding both the propagating impacts and necessary 
responses. The present-day context in which the systems operate is coloured 
yellow and evolves into an uncertain future, depicted as stacked scenarios 
or storylines. 
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suggests adverse impacts, opportunities may also arise from such im-
pacts. The implication is that regardless of the types of impacts, they 
may require some kind of response or adaptation to offset damage or to 
exploit possible benefits. An understanding of the transmission of im-
pacts can therefore help to inform responses for ameliorating the 
resulting recipient risk. We illustrate some initial impacts and their 
propagation in Section 3, below. 
The options available for responding to the recipient risk by indi-
vidual or multiple actors in the region of interest are illustrated in the 
green area of Fig. 2. 
As the logical counterpart to the impact transmission system, we 
refer to these different types of response collectively as the response 
transmission system. These are responses, which may be reactive (at time 
T2) or anticipatory (at time T-1). Responses may involve interventions to 
mitigate the risk at the point of receipt (e.g., by altering exposure or 
vulnerability to the impacts actually or potentially received). They could 
also involve interventions that are directly targeted at one or more of the 
impacts being propagated in the impact transmission system and/or at 
the source of the initial impact. Then there are responses that may 
ameliorate the recipient risk indirectly, via a third party or external 
system component, for instance by influencing other actors to intervene 
in the impact transmission system or at the source of the initial impact or 
by spreading the recipient risk among additional systems. Another 
possible response (not shown) is to mitigate the causes of climate 
change, but outcomes would normally be manifest at longer time scales 
than these adaptation responses and while vital as a policy measure, 
they are not considered further here. 
In a complex dynamic system, responses are also very likely to have 
unintended consequences. Change in one part of a dynamic system leads 
to changes in another part, and these consequent changes are not always 
controllable or foreseeable. It is therefore important that responses are 
framed in this systemic way so that it is possible to identify and analyse 
the ethical, political and self-interested rationales that might result in 
such unintended consequences (and see Simpson et al., 2021). 
It is important to acknowledge that the ability of a regional actor to 
manage the recipient risk depends on the actor’s sphere of influence with 
respect both to the impact transmission system and to the wider context 
in which the risks are generated (green shading in Fig. 2). This will likely 
be a gradient or continuum from “total control” to “no influence” and 
may change over time and in response to the climate impact. To take a 
commodity trading example, a country may exert more political and 
economic influence on a distant trading partner with which it has a long- 
standing trading relationship than it does on a nearby country managing 
the transit of commodities in a supply chain affected by a remote climate 
event. 
In reality, multiple cross-border impacts are taking place in the wider 
context of an interconnected, globalised and evolving world (yellow 
rectangular area representing the present-day in Fig. 2). The impact 
transmission system and response transmission system that directly 
affect the recipient risk can be expected to interact with external systems 
that account for all other aspects of natural and societal processes. The 
environment and society are constantly evolving, which affects the 
context in which future risks due to cross-border impacts will occur. 
Uncertainties in the future context can be represented using alternative 
scenarios or storylines of environmental change (which influence the 
triggers of initial impacts) and of socio-economic development (which 
mediate impact propagation as well as potential interventions). Each 
alternative future is represented as a stacked uncoloured rectangle in 
Fig. 2. All future developments can be considered hypothetical, with 
some (e.g., those that imply a business as usual development) potentially 
serving as reference or “counterfactual” cases for testing the effective-
ness of different adaptation measures. 
3. Typologies of cross-border impacts and response 
The conceptual framework illustrated in Fig. 2, of necessity, is a 
simplified representation of reality. The processes of cross-border im-
pacts may materialise in many different ways, and it is important to 
understand these in order to design appropriate responses. It can also be 
helpful to characterise the separate elements and their assumed causal 
relationships for assisting in the deployment of suitable methods of 
assessment. Many of these elements are depicted in Fig. 3, which can be 
thought of as a toolbox from which components are selected according 
to a case in question, and inserted in the relevant part of the conceptual 
framework. However, it should also be understood that given the 
numerous variants and complexities of cross-border impacts, the ex-
amples shown in Fig. 3 are intended to be indicative and are by no means 
exhaustive. 
3.1. Types of climate trigger 
Two types of climate trigger are identified in Fig. 3a: weather shocks 
and slow onset events. The trigger may be a short-period weather shock, 
which could be an individual event (e.g., flood, storm, heatwave or 
drought), compound concurrent or consecutive event (e.g., coincident 
pluvial flood, storm surge and strong wind) or simultaneous “tele-
connected” weather events at distant locations that are related to a 
single cause (e.g., floods and droughts in different regions due to El Niño 
conditions). Alternatively, the trigger may be a longer-period, slow onset 
event, such as a gradual increase in climate-related stress due to a slow 
change of climate across a critical threshold (e.g., shifting zones of crop 
suitability due to warming and drying that decreases productivity in 
core production areas). 
3.2. Categories of cross-border impacts 
The unique characteristic of cross-border climate change impacts 
represented in this conceptual framework is that the initial impact of 
climate occurs remotely from its final consequence and potential re-
sponses, and that both impacts and potentially also responses to those 
impacts are transmitted across one or more borders. There are various 
classifications of such impacts in the literature (e.g., see Benzie et al., 
2016; Hildén et al., 2016; Lung et al., 2017) and seven categories are 
identified here (Fig. 3b), based on Benzie et al. (2019): trade (e.g., flows 
of commodities on international markets), finance (the movement or 
change in value of public and private capital), people (movement of 
people across borders, such as through migration and tourism), psy-
chological (impacts brought about by actions of different actors and 
particularly the media, based on their perceptions and communication 
of cross-border risks and opportunities – referred to as a cognitive filter 
by Benzie et al., 2019), geopolitical (e.g., climate-related impacts on in-
ternational relations, resource access and strategy), biophysical (e.g., 
water transfer among hydrological systems and movement of species, 
pests or pathogens) and infrastructure (e.g., transport and telecommu-
nications links). Examples that each involve one or more of these are 
illustrated in Section 4, below. 
3.3. Impact transmission scales 
In Fig. 3c we have identified some of the scales at which impacts may 
be transmitted following an initial impact. Impact propagation from the 
initial impact to the recipient risk occurs across a border or borders that 
can be administrative, physical or societal. The scales of transmission 
may be characterised as: 
• Across neighbouring regions: transmission between locations in adja-
cent geographical regions (e.g., transmission of floodwater in a 
shared river basin from one country to another).  
• Between remote regions: transmission between locations distant from 
one another and separated by multiple borders (e.g., impacts of a 
supply shortfall of a traded food commodity affected by weather at 
one location and transmitted via higher prices in the global food 
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trade system to regions dependent on its import but remote from the 
weather impact).  
• External impact; local transmission: where the initial impact occurs in 
a jurisdiction external to the recipient risk, whereas all subsequent 
impacts are transmitted within the same, “local” jurisdiction as the 
recipient risk (e.g., storm damage at a major container port in Brazil 
may disrupt deliveries of commodities to a European port of entry 
such as Rotterdam, with subsequent cascading repercussions through 
supply chains across Europe).  
• External impact and transmission: where the initial impact and all 
subsequent impacts are transmitted within a jurisdiction external to 
the recipient risk (e.g., losses to rice production between an Asian 
producer experiencing harvest failure, quality deterioration at on- 
site storage facilities and spillage during transportation to a 
Fig. 3. Typologies for representing cross-border climate change impacts. Specific cases may treat one or more categories of cross-border impacts (b) characterised by 
types of climate triggers (a), impact transmission scales (c) and dynamics (d), and response transmission targets (e) and dynamics (f). These are indicative and not 
intended to be comprehensive. For explanation, see text. 
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processing plant prior to manufacture of a food product, and then 
shipment to a European port of entry).  
• Multi-regional: propagation of impacts involves transmission via 
system components located in more than one jurisdiction between 
the initial impact and recipient risk (e.g., drought affecting water 
availability, transfer and multi-purpose use in an international river 
system passing through several countries). 
In fact, the above distinctions are somewhat blurred. For instance, 
the location of impact transmission in the third and fourth cases above 
might be regarded simply as nuanced variants of multi-regional scale 
transmission, Note also that though impacts are used to illustrate the 
scales of cross-border transmission in Fig. 3c, similar scale demarcations 
could also be envisaged for the transmission of responses (not shown). 
3.4. Impact transmission dynamics 
The transmission of impacts can take place in many different con-
figurations, sometimes combining features of several of these. We 
illustrate six options in Fig. 3d.  
• Cascade tiers describe a situation in which the propagation of an 
initial impact is transmitted through a cascade of impacts on system 
components. Impacts at each tier of the cascade are themselves 
associated with a recipient risk of concern, the extent of which may 
be influenced by other features of the transmission dynamics. For 
example, businesses handling materials at different ‘stages’ of a 
complex supply chain (e.g., export, processing, retail), with disrup-
tions at each stage having knock-on consequences e.g., for profit-
ability for each recipient group.  
• An escalating cascade characterises cases in which impacts are being 
transmitted in a cascade from one system component to another, 
with each subsequent impact amplified compared to the previous 
one. For instance, this kind of situation can sometimes arise in supply 
chains following a climate-induced shortfall in a commodity, a rise in 
price that subsequently provokes an over-reaction such as panic 
buying, stockpiling or market intervention that drives up the price of 
the commodity even further than the original situation might have 
merited.  
• A diminishing cascade, is the inverse of the escalating cascade, where 
each subsequent impact propagated in a cascade is dampened or 
reduced compared to the previous one. Using a similar supply chain 
example, fixed prices may be built-in to contracts between retailers 
and suppliers, hence safeguarding prices for recipient consumers but 
also implying that suppliers would absorb any additional costs 
(potentially exposing them to increased impacts).  
• A feedback cascade refers to cases in which impacts propagating from 
one system component to another may actually feed back to earlier 
links of the cascade, hence adding complexity to the impact trans-
mission and its influence on the recipient risk. For example, perish-
able food products affected by weather at a source location may 
suffer quality losses during transportation to manufacturing plants, 
resulting in requests for additional high quality produce from sup-
pliers at points earlier in the supply chain.  
• Compound impacts can be realised in different ways. The variant 
shown in Fig. 3d is where initial impacts occur concurrently at two 
different locations and are propagated through separate impact 
transmission systems before converging to affect the same recipient 
human or natural asset at risk. For example, a drought in one location 
affects the supply and price of hydroelectric power whilst a heatwave 
at another location affects the cooling capacity, supply and price for 
water-cooled nuclear power, with both sources contributing to the 
overall cost of electricity for a recipient consumer. Another variant 
might involve climate impacts of one type that may induce impacts 
of another type (e.g., a drought may predispose a region to crop 
failure, with implications for food security in a recipient region, but 
may also induce wildfires, leading to cross-border smoke pollution 
that can aggravate health problems in the same recipient region). 
3.5. Response transmission targets 
Responses designed to ameliorate the risk of cross-border impacts 
can be directed towards a number of possible sources of that risk 
(Fig. 3e). Responses may involve interventions that target: 
• the initial impact, directed at the source of that impact (e.g., by of-
fering assistance to repair damaged infrastructure at a key export 
hub following a catastrophic storm);  
• the impact transmission system, through actions directed at one or 
more of its system components (e.g., by using diplomatic means to 
discourage market interventions by countries affected by a weather- 
related commodity shortage that might aggravate shortages 
elsewhere);  
• the location of recipient risk, by reducing exposure or vulnerability of 
assets affected by the impacts and hence mitigating the risk at the 
point of receipt (e.g., reducing exposure to supply interruptions by 
increasing strategic reserves of a key commodity);  
• a third party, where the risk is ameliorated indirectly via an external 
system component, for instance, by influencing other actors to 
intervene in the impact transmission system or at the source of the 
initial impact (e.g., encouraging other countries to provide assistance 
to repair damaged infrastructure) or by spreading the recipient risk 
among additional systems (e.g., see substitution in section 3.6, 
below). 
Note also that responses may not be targeted exclusively to avoid or 
ameliorate adverse impacts. Some may be directed towards exploiting 
beneficial effects, for example to invest in additional storage and 
infrastructural capacity to account for growing crop productivity in 
exporting regions benefiting from a shift to more favourable climate. 
3.6. Response transmission dynamics 
The transmission of responses to ameliorate propagating impacts can 
be highly complex, with many potential impediments or amplifiers 
affecting the dynamics of transmission. A few examples that characterise 
this complexity include (Fig. 3f):  
• Sequential recovery, where responses to impacts on individual system 
components along a chain of impacts may be intentionally staggered 
in time to target critical points of vulnerability over less crucial el-
ements (e.g., to prioritise actions at a major choke point in a supply 
chain).  
• Block, which refers to means for setting up barriers to prevent the 
cascading impacts from affecting the assets at risk (e.g., by putting in 
place effective screening mechanisms to inhibit the spread of crop 
pests via imported plants or seeds into regions that would potentially 
offer a new niche under a changed climate).  
• Substitution describes the spreading of risk by opening an alternative 
channel for that risk via a third party or external system component 
(e.g., negotiating a new agreement with an alternative supplier of a 
key commodity).  
• Variable influence on the impact transmission system, indicates how 
the ability to respond can vary according to the sphere of influence 
exerted by the regional actor managing the recipient risk (e.g., a 
country may exert more political and economic influence on a distant 
trading partner with which it has an historical trading relationship 
than it does on on a nearby country managing the transit of that 
commodity on purely commercial grounds).  
• Group of actors refers to cases where climate impacts propagating 
through the same impact transmission system poses risks for 
different recipient actors, each of which organises responses either 
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individually or collectively. To illustrate, repatriation of citizens in 
response to severe hurricane damage in Caribbean tourist destina-
tions visited by Europeans would ordinarily be organised separately 
by individual countries, whilst disaster relief for the source region 
might be coordinated at EU level. 
3.7. Socio-economic and environmental context 
Cross-border climate change impacts are influenced by the larger- 
scale context in which they occur at a given point in time (see Fig. 2). This 
context is commonly described by sets of driving factors that charac-
terise the major controls on socio-economic and environmental condi-
tions. These are indicators for which quantitative or qualitative 
information is available or might need to be gathered afresh, whether 
from statistics of past and new observations or from model projections or 
narrative conjectures (scenarios) of the future. A useful basis for 
selecting socioeconomic drivers in climate change assessment is pro-
vided by the shared socioeconomic pathways (SSPs), for which nine 
categories have been suggested as relevant for defining challenges to 
mitigation and adaptation (O’Neill et al., 2014): demographics, eco-
nomic development, welfare, resources, institutions and governance, 
technological development, broader societal factors and policies and 
environmental and ecological factors. The last of these are typically 
characterised by climate model projections based on representative 
concentration pathways (RCPs) that describe alternative trajectories of 
future greenhouse gases and aerosols in the atmosphere (e.g., Ito et al., 
2020), and hence link directly to the climate triggers (assuming appro-
priate attribution). Socioeconomic drivers influence society’s exposure 
and vulnerability to climate that are integral in preconditioning the 
types of impacts set in train by a climate trigger. Importantly, many of 
the same factors, such as poverty, inequality, governance and education, 
also predispose society to impacts due to non-climate triggers. Hence, by 
framing cross-border climate impacts and their responses in a wider 
context, both the environmental and social dimensions of resilience (see 
Opdyke et al., 2017) can be enhanced across a range of potential risks. 
Finally, whilst most of these contextual drivers describe trends or 
period-averaged conditions, singular wild card events (not depicted in 
Fig. 3), such as wars, pandemics or major volcanic eruptions, can trigger 
effects that are often unexpected, acute and far-reaching and may 
interact with climate-related impacts. 
4. Operationalising the framework 
In order to explore the potential value of the conceptual framework, 
Table 1 
Six contrasting examples of cross-border impacts of climate change, comparing categories of impact, recipient regions at risk, time frame, type and attribution of 
climate trigger, scale and transmission dynamics of impacts and responses. Italicised entries refer to elements depicted in Fig. 3.  




Climate trigger & 
attribution 
Impact transmission Response transmission 








supply chain risks) 
Observed Weather shock 
(flooding) 
Attributed1 





Target recipient risk 








Finland (risk for 












Single tier cascade 
(increased generating 
capacity affecting the 
price of imported 
electricity) 
Substitution (invest in 
renewables & smart 
demand management); 







Trade EU & China (consumer 
risks) US, Paraguay & 
Brazil (producer 
benefits) 






Single tier cascade 
(transfer of costs along 
the supply chain) 
Diminishing cascade 
(initial soy price rises; 




planting in Brazil & US; 
EU & China imports 







Sudan & Egypt (water 
security) 





Double tier cascade (water 
for irrigation and 
hydropower)12,13 
Group of actors (legally 
binding international 
agreements on water 
release)9 













Slow onset (warming 
& sea ice decline) 
Attributed15 
Multi-regional Multiple tier cascade 
(resource exploitation; 
trading routes; tourism; 
environmental 
impacts)16,17 
Group of actors 
(security via 
diplomatic & military 
means; environmental 
protection); 
Block (access to ice-free 







United Kingdom (food 
affordability) 
Observed Weather shock 




Multi-regional Compound impacts (yield 
shortfall of staple crops 
in Russia & Pakistan): 
Escalating cascade (cereal 
yield decline; food price 
rise; export ban; panic 
buying)18 
Target recipient risk 
(food banks in UK); 
Target initial impacts 
(food aid to Pakistan)18  
1 Promchote et al. (2016); 2 Haraguchi and Lall (2015); 3 Hilden et al. (2018); 4 Caloiero et al. (2018); 5 Rajczak and Schär (2017); 6 Polansek et al. (2018); 7 Masante 
et al. (2018); 8 Sly (2017); 9 Whittington et al. (2014); 10 Coffel et al. (2019); 11 Aziz et al. (2019); 12 Basheer et al. (2020); 13 Allam and Allam (2007); 14 European 
Political Strategy Centre (2019); 15 Meredith et al. (2019); 16 Hill et al. (2015); 17 Meier et al. (2014); 18 Challinor et al. (2018); 19 Russo et al. (2014); 20 Houze et al. 
(2011); 21Mann et al. (2017)  
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we present a provisional operationalisation below via a set of six con-
trasting examples (Table 1). All elements of the framework are described 
for each case: categories of impact, recipients, triggers, impact trans-
mission scales and dynamics, and response targets and dynamics. The 
variety of examples in the table shows that the framework can be 
operationalised in quite different contexts to describe and compare 
impacts between neighbouring regions in both developed and devel-
oping countries (e.g., Scandinavian and East African hydropower 
infrastructure), throughout complex international systems (e.g., 
manufacturing supply chains and agricultural commodity markets) and 
in regional hotspots (e.g., the Arctic). 
As a means of demonstrating the framework in more detail, we have 
attempted to map some of the transmission dynamics involved in two of 
the cases shown in Table 1 (see Figs. 4 and 5). For each case, elements of 
the typology (shown in Fig. 3) have been combined to map the cascade 
of impacts (red arrows) between system components (blue boxes) and to 
highlight the potential targets of responses (green arrows). 
4.1. Observed cross-border impacts of the 2011 Thailand floods 
Fig. 4 expands on the example of the 2011 Thai flooding introduced 
in Section 1. Its cause was a compound event (Leonard et al., 2014; 
Zscheischler et al., 2020) – an unprecedented amount of rain falling on 
already saturated land – a phenomenon thought to be exacerbated by 
greenhouse gas induced climate forcing (Promchote et al., 2016). The 
underlying reasons for the severity of the impacts included failure by 
overseas investors to anticipate the high likelihood of flooding when 
locating facilities in the region, poor flood defences exacerbated by local 
land subsidence that magnified the hazard and a low effectiveness at 
accessing alternative supply networks and procurement sources to help 
mitigate the impacts (Haraguchi and Lall, 2015). 
With respect to manufacturing supply chains, the initial impact was 
the inundation of seven major industrial estates located in the Bangkok 
hinterland. This led to the temporary closure of factories supplying key 
components to the car and electronics industries (choke points), with 
Japanese companies especially severely affected and severe delays 
Fig. 4. Observed cross-border impacts of, and responses to, the Thailand floods of 2011 (for further explanation, see text).  
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experienced in procuring substitute components from other sources 
unaffected by the flooding. Reduced production was felt globally and 
accompanied by a rise in prices. Some lessons were drawn in the finance 
sector, as insurers took a large hit (especially in Japan) and responded 
by introducing sub-limits for flooding. This induced the Thai govern-
ment to introduce a National Catastrophe Insurance Fund to reassure 
international investors in regions likely to be susceptible to future 
flooding. Infrastructure damage was repaired with some assistance from 
disaster funds established abroad (including in the European Union). 
Japanese companies were the most exposed to the flood hazards, and 
responded by seeking to diversify component procurement sources, 
stock-piling components at a higher level than earlier whilst successfully 
lobbying for the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) to 
invest in a Flood Management Plan for the Chao Phraya River. For more 
details, see Haraguchi and Lall (2015). 
4.2. Ongoing and potential cross-border impacts of Arctic sea ice decline 
Fig. 5 demonstrates how slow onset regional climate change can 
open up opportunities and risks for exploitation of the Arctic, with po-
tential implications for EU policy in the region. Anthropogenic climate 
change is manifested as strong temperature increases in the Arctic re-
gion, a slow onset event whose initial impact is the retreat of Arctic sea 
ice. A decrease in summer sea ice area of more than 13% per decade has 
already been observed, half of which can be attributed to increased 
concentrations of atmospheric greenhouse gases (Meredith et al., 2019). 
The opening up of Arctic coastal regions and of natural resources pre-
viously inaccessible beneath the ice presents a theoretical opportunity 
for exploitation, driven by a wide range of economic and socio-political 
motives and processes unrelated to climate change. One of the first ef-
fects is the transboundary psychological impact of wide recognition of 
the change. This may lead to concrete actions by national, transnational 
and corporate actors propagating through an impact transmission 
Fig. 5. Ongoing and potential cross-border impacts of Arctic sea ice decline (for further explanation, see text).  
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system. Arctic states, including some EU member states, and private 
companies are already manoeuvring to stake their claims to territory 
and resources in the region, some backing this with military presence 
(Hill et al., 2015). Non-Arctic states are also competing to exploit new 
possibilities to invest in Arctic infrastructure to facilitate resource 
extraction, the opening of trading routes and tourism (Meier et al., 
2014). These economic activities would also introduce acute hazards to 
the fragile Arctic environment. All these shifts impact the EU’s interests 
and motivates its interest to seek influence in the region. Here, policies 
to protect EU interests in the Arctic, the recipient risk, may include 
diplomatic efforts to forward EU interests, investments in some of the 
economic opportunities, as well as policies to protect the Arctic envi-
ronment (European Political Strategy Centre, 2019). Hence, although 
climate change is the underlying driver of change, any adaptation ac-
tions to address its consequences must necessarily account for the full 
gamut of non-climate drivers to ensure that such measures (e.g., the 
development of safety infrastructure to cope with increased marine 
traffic) and their related investments are both effective and coherent. 
4.3. Challenges of operationalisation 
Various challenges need to be overcome when operationalising the 
conceptual framework. These include the lack of specific scientific 
studies that describe in detail the links between different system com-
ponents. It is therefore necessary, in many cases, to interpret patchy, 
often anecdotal evidence in order to connect changes, for example to 
attribute the role of an initial impact in driving a cascade of subsequent 
impacts. The difficulty of separating a climate cause from many other 
potential triggers of impacts and their transmission (e.g., economic, 
political, environmental or health-related triggers) is another formi-
dable challenge. This is discussed further in section 5.5, below, in the 
context of wider systemic risks and their potential management. 
Defining system boundaries for each case can also present chal-
lenges. By opening up the complexity of impact transmission systems, it 
is necessary to delineate the limits of those systems in order to 
concentrate on the system components – and the transmission of impacts 
– that are most relevant in driving the risk to a specified recipient. For 
instance, in the case of the 2011 Thailand floods it is necessary to decide 
which system components are vital to include for the purpose of map-
ping the risk to Japanese manufacturers from the initial flood event in 
Thailand. In this case, the available evidence (i.e., Haraguchi and Lall, 
2015) indicated that the Japanese and global hard disk drive and car 
manufacturing supply chains were the most relevant system components 
to include, along with the finance sector for infrastructural reconstruc-
tion and climate-proofing. But this decision is to some extent arbitrary 
and could be made differently in a situation where there is either 
alternative or more robust evidence available, or if the recipient itself (or 
other recipients) are understood as being subject to or perceiving 
different types of risk (e.g., risks to food security in low income countries 
brought on in the same flooding by damage to 1.2 million hectares of 
Thai rice cultivation area and its effects on the world market price – Son 
et al., 2013). Thus the operationalisation of the conceptual framework is 
dependent on the type of evidence available, the choice of recipient 
region, decisions and assumptions about the risks of interest to re-
cipients and the extent of system boundaries applied to each case. 
5. Discussion 
This section discusses the reasons why a conceptual framework 
describing cascading, cross-border climate change impacts is considered 
necessary and useful and how the framework introduced above con-
tributes to this objective. At the outset, and in addition to national 
studies indicating their significance (see Introduction), a focus on the 
risks resulting specifically from climate change triggers can readily be 
justified from growing evidence in the literature. The IPCC Fifth 
Assessment Report concluded that “climate change is projected to 
amplify existing climate-related risks and create new risks for natural 
and human systems…”, some of which “…will have cascading effects” 
(IPCC, 2014, p. 14). In line with such trends, it is quite possible that 
cross-border climate change impacts will become more important in the 
future. 
Then there are alternative possible framings of cross-border impacts. 
For example, some of these focus on other triggers of cross-border 
impact (e.g., non-climatic natural disasters, political or economic cri-
ses or shocks), or on categories of risk (e.g., food security risks or mili-
tary and security risks). Framings may also adopt a user-oriented or “risk 
owner” perspective (Young et al., 2017) in contrast to a risk origin 
perspective (e.g., operational supply chain risk framing – Ghadge et al., 
2020). 
Relevant comparable frameworks exist in “non-climate” fields. For 
example, Keow Cheng and Hon Kam’s (2008) framework for analysing 
risk in supply networks describes the role of different network structures 
(similar to our system components and typology in Fig. 3) as influencing 
the nature and pattern of risk transmission, mostly in industrial supply 
chains. In evaluating the risks themselves, there are parallels to be 
drawn with the “material criticality” approach used to assess risks to 
vital raw materials of importance in Europe. This evaluates supply chain 
risks as the product of a commodity’s economic value and the likelihood 
of its disruption, related to its substitutability (Blengini et al., 2017). 
Examples also exist in the sustainable development literature, for 
example the tele-coupling framework introduced by Liu et al. (2013), 
which describes causes and effects with distinct “sending” and “spill- 
over” systems (similar to our impact transmission system) and 
“receiving” systems (similar to our recipient). Both of these non-climate 
focused frameworks aim to describe the flow of potential impacts be-
tween geographically separate systems. 
The advantages of a detailed and comprehensive framework are 
fourfold: (i) it provides a common language with which to identify and 
assess cross-border impacts, (ii) it contributes to enhancing our under-
standing of those impacts by providing structure and clarity, (iii) it fa-
cilitates comparisons between studies on diverse aspects of cross-border 
impacts and (iv) it informs policy to reduce the risks such impacts pose 
to society. The remainder of this section looks into each of these points 
in more detail. 
5.1. Providing a nomenclature 
As noted, the first wave of studies that have emerged in recent years 
to identify and assess cross-border climate change impacts have used 
different terms and conceptualisations of the mechanisms via which 
climate change impacts in one place result in risks somewhere else. A 
nomenclature therefore needs to be provided and established to enable a 
more consistent and enriching dialogue between the various stake-
holders implicated in the process of adapting toameliorate these risks, 
including those from various disciplines and fields of research and 
strategic planners from public, private and international sectors. The 
conceptual framework is an attempt to provide this nomenclature for 
each of the elements and mechanisms involved. 
5.2. Enhancing understanding 
The conceptual framework presented here can be used to identify 
and connect different bodies of existing knowledge about climate 
change from a range of disciplines. The field of climate change impacts, 
adaptation and vulnerability research is already a diverse and in some 
cases fragmented one, with significant challenges pertaining to the 
integration of knowledge across disciplines, sectors and – especially now 
given the emergence of cross-border impacts as an important theme – 
geographical scales (e.g., see Harrison et al., 2015). The conceptual 
framework presented here provides a mechanism for the transparent 
and systematic integration of evidence drawn from a diversity of scales 
and disciplines to enhance understanding of climate risk propagation. 
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The conceptual framework provides an architecture that can also be 
applied and evolved to improve the relevance of knowledge that is used 
to support the design of adaptation responses in an interconnected 
world. By combining a typology of impact transmission dynamics and 
typologies of response targets and response dynamics, the framework 
integrates the two separate but interrelated processes of impact and risk 
identification with response planning. This is especially important given 
the complex international context in which cross-border climate change 
impacts – and responses to these impacts – will occur. A framework such 
as this one, which makes explicit the interaction between impacts and 
responses, is particularly valuable for enhancing our understanding of 
the political and policy opportunities (and challenges) for global coop-
eration on adaptation. It also helps to widen recognition of global cross- 
border impacts, regardless of their causal origin, and the importance of 
systemic resilience. 
5.3. Facilitating comparison 
Given the broad scope of knowledge on and for adaptation (diverse 
disciplines, scales and geographies) it is both valuable and necessary to 
increase the comparability between adaptation case studies (Biesbroek 
et al., 2018). In addressing cross-border climate change impacts, adap-
tation planners will potentially need to consider a very diverse range of 
risks (i.e., across the categories depicted in Fig. 3b, such as trade, 
finance, biophysical and geopolitical impacts) and therefore be required 
to synthesise knowledge spanning multiple disciplines and compare 
between results with diverging levels of specificity and uncertainty. In 
this context, a conceptual framework such as the one presented above is 
potentially very useful. In Section 4 we illustrated how the framework 
enables comparison between illustrative cases. Fuller applications of the 
framework, via in depth case studies, would reveal in more detail how it 
can enable comparison between impacts, recipient risks and responses. 
This would both enhance adaptation knowledge but could also support 
more integrated adaptation planning. 
5.4. Informing policy 
The conceptual framework helps to inform policy in two principal 
ways. First, it supports adaptation planners from a single organisation in 
improving the relevance of their climate risk assessments. It does this by 
providing a structure that accommodates climate triggers and a range of 
possible impact transmission processes, many unrelated to climate, from 
beyond the jurisdictional border of the decision maker. This enables the 
identification and subsequent assessment of systemic risks and associ-
ated uncertainties, which can inform the design of responses to 
ameliorate these risks, hence accounting for climate within the wider 
context of enhancing resilience. Second, it helps to identify where 
cooperation between actors will be necessary or beneficial for imple-
menting adaptation. It does this by helping to reveal where an actor 
within the response transmission system is somehow interdependent 
with system components that are under the control or influence of 
another actor or actors. This is particularly important as impacts and 
responses can be affected by the actions of a range of actors with 
differing motivations and representing interests of both the public and 
private sectors. For example, with reference to Fig. 4, applying the 
conceptual framework reveals to the coordinator of national adaptation 
planning in a country like Japan that employment and social stability 
there will be affected by impacts to international supply chains triggered 
by flooding events and the disruption caused to the manufacture of key 
components in countries like Thailand. This raises various options for 
adaptation, including awareness raising in the private sector on the need 
for diversification of component supply (see Kahiluoto et al., 2020), or 
increased cooperation between Japan and Thailand to explore measures 
and potentially even burden sharing, to increase the resilience of the 
links between Japan and Thailand in the face of increasing future 
climate threats (e.g., the JICA Flood Management Plan). The framework 
could also be applied to inform policy that seeks to reduce climate risks 
across entire systems, for example across international agricultural 
commodity markets, such as the soy case featured in Table 1. 
The global nature of the adaptation challenge has been recognised 
relatively late in the international political process orchestrated by the 
UNFCCC. The establishment of the global goal on adaptation in Article 
7.2 of the Paris Agreement (United Nations, 2015) may signify a new era 
in global cooperation on adaptation, but progress with implementation – 
and understanding of the role of cross-border climate change impacts as 
a driver for international cooperation – is slow and insufficient. Global 
governance of adaptation remains a contested topic, due in part to the 
poor definition or articulation of adaptation as a global problem (Pers-
son, 2019). The conceptual framework helps to explain why and how 
adaptation is a global challenge with international dimensions. 
5.5. Limitations of the conceptual framework 
The framework presented above is research-oriented more than it is 
user-oriented. Its focus on climate change triggers means that it em-
phasises the origins of cross-border impacts at the expense of other 
categories of risk or risk ownership. As such, it may be more effective in 
its current form for organising research and structuring and comparing 
knowledge about society’s exposure to climate risk, than as the basis for 
a practical tool to support decision making. A climate focus also has the 
danger of downplaying other risks (e.g., triggered by political, eco-
nomic, geophysical or health circumstances) whose solutions may share 
many features of those advocated to address climate risks. For example, 
the COVID-19 crisis has drawn attention to the risks of geographical 
concentration and lack of resiliency in supply chains for semiconductor 
companies (McKinsey & Company, 2020; Deloitte, 2020) as well as via 
interconnected global networks more generally (van den Hurk et al., 
2020). This points to the need for careful contextualisation of studies of 
cross-border impacts and their responses, so that insights can be used to 
support the building of resilience across a range of systemic risks. 
The framework is also likely to be incomplete in its coverage of 
specific mechanisms and typologies of impact and response dynamics, as 
well as of scales and response targets. Further testing, in a diverse range 
of sectoral, geographic and data-rich contexts, will be needed to improve 
its coverage and fill gaps in the current typologies. 
The framework also focuses in its current form more on impact 
transmission than response transmission. Its primary objective is to 
provide a nomenclature and structure to raise awareness about and 
enhance understanding of cross-border impacts. However, the 
complexity, scale, drivers, effects, feedbacks and interaction between 
responses are likely to be more far reaching than is suggested in this 
current version. Further theoretical and empirical analysis of the 
governance of cross-border climate change impacts is needed to inform 
the development of a more sophisticated response-focused framework. 
5.6. Future research 
A number of opportunities exist to use and improve the framework. 
Ex-ante applications of the conceptual framework in novel research 
projects will help to test and hopefully refine the elements and overall 
composition of the framework. Detailed empirical case studies that 
operationalise the elements of the framework are therefore encouraged. 
The conceptual elements identified could be built on to develop a 
modelling framework or modelling protocols to support improved 
quantitative assessment of cross-border climate change impacts. Argu-
ably, the potential of existing quantitative assessment methods of 
different types has not yet been realised in the context of assessing cross- 
sector impacts (Challinor et al., 2018), though examples are available of 
computable general equilibrium models being applied to assess the 
cross-border dynamics of climate impacts at the global scale (e.g., see 
Schenker, 2013; Schenker and Stephan, 2014). Some elements described 
in the framework (i.e., triggers, impact and response transmission 
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dynamics and their feedbacks) are typically addressed using different 
types of computational models, in many cases applied to different sec-
tors. Though challenging in its complexity, non-linearities and un-
certainties, there may be potential, nonetheless, to use the conceptual 
framework to inform the integration of modelling components in new 
ways. Moreover, even without full model integration the framework can 
be used to support the interpretation of different model results, hence 
enhancing our understanding of cross-border climate change impact 
transmission and the potential mediating effect of policy responses in 
complex cross-border systems. 
Another device for exploring and describing case examples that have 
been operationalised using the framework could be through analysis of 
climate event storylines (e.g., Shepherd et al., 2018; Shepherd, 2019). 
This involves mapping complex cross-border impacts that have been 
observed in order to improve the understanding of the processes, in-
teractions and dynamics of the sort illustrated in Fig. 3. It also makes use 
of counterfactuals to explore hypothetical worst case scenarios or to test 
the effectiveness of policy responses (see Section 2). 
Furthermore, while the scope of the paper focuses on climate-related 
risks, we believe the conceptual framework we propose could be utilised 
fruitfully to explore other dimensions of cross-border risks not driven by 
climate. For instance, it could be merged with the more practical anal-
ysis being developed on cross-border financial contagion risks (Bricco 
and Xu, 2019) to understand more clearly their drivers, transmission 
channels and impacts. 
Finally, the evolution and application of this research-targeted 
framework into a more user-oriented format would help to realise its 
potential contribution for improving adaptation decision making and 
outcomes. This could be by way of providing groundwork for preparing 
guidance or even developing a decision support tool for national adap-
tation planners. 
6. Conclusions 
Cross-border climate change impacts have received limited attention 
to date. The cases we have reviewed demonstrate their potential 
disruptive force. Global interconnections create complex dynamics that 
are challenging to trace and understand. This also complicates the 
design and implementation of adaptation responses. A conceptualisation 
of cross-border impacts is a first step towards understanding them. The 
conceptual framework presented here provides a simple, but flexible, 
structure to describe and analyse cross-border climate impacts and their 
consequences. It offers a foundation for consistent comparisons of 
different patterns of cross-border impacts in different sectors and ge-
ographies. It can also be used to inform adaptation planning. The 
framework can help in the identification of subtle dynamics that may 
guide new empirical research and data collection as well as model 
development. In particular, with systematic application of the frame-
work it is possible to highlight gaps in our existing understanding of 
system dynamics, or gain new insights into particular leverage points 
within the system. These can be targeted in order to find ways of 
building resilience to climate change in the region of origin, along the 
impact transmission system and in the recipient region exposed to the 
propagated risk. 
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